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In order to grasp the notion of the kenosis (exinanitio) of 
Christ according to Thomas Aquinas, we propose a study comprised of 
four parts. The first part looks into the exegesis of Philippians 2:6–8 in 
Aquinas’s commentary on St. Paul. The second provides some further 
details, drawn from other works of Aquinas, regarding the exinanitio of 
the Son. The goal of these two first parts is specifying the way in which 
Aquinas understands kenosis in the context of Philippians 2. They are 
indispensable for understanding the question of kenosis as it is presented in 
Aquinas without beginning by projecting upon his work problematics that 
are foreign to him. A third part offers a brief survey of Trinitarian “proces-
sions,” “missions,” and creation, in order to clarify the Thomistic meaning 
of the exinanitio. Lastly, in the fourth part, we present two Trinitarian 
foundations of the kenosis of the Son that Aquinas develops in reference 
to Philippians 2.1
1   In the references to Aquinas’s works, the numbers (no., nos.) refer to the number-
ing of the Marietti edition: Super epistolas S. Pauli lectura, ed. Raffaele Cai, 8th rev. 
ed., 2 vols. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1953); Super evangelium S. Ioannis lectura, 
ed. Raffaele Cai, 5th rev. edition (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1952); In librum 
beati Dionysii de divinis nominibus [In de div. nom.], ed. Ceslas Pera (Turin and 
Rome: Marietti, 1950); Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium 
seu Summa contra gentiles [SCG], vols. II and III, ed. Ceslas Pera, Pierre Marc and 
Pietro Caramello (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1961). I used the Leonine edition 
for all other works, except for: Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, vol. I, ed. Pierre 
Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929); vol. III, ed. Marie-Fabien Moos (Paris: 
Lethielleux, 1933); Catena aurea in quatuor evangelia, ed. Angelico Guarienti, 9th 
ed., 2 vols., (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1953); De potentia and De unione Verbi 
incarnati, in Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2, ed. Pio Bazzi, Mannes Calcaterra, Tito 
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Aquinas’s Commentary on Philippians 2
In the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the notion of “kenosis” (exinanitio) is 
essentially ethical and Christological. If one considers the context of Philip-
pians 2, the interpretation of Thomas is “moral,” as in most of the Fathers of 
the Church and medieval authors: St. Paul exhorts Christians to fraternal 
unity, to the virtue of humility, to respect for others, and to mutual care. 
Like most of his contemporaries and his patristic sources,2 Thomas does 
not have knowledge of the liturgical origin of Philippians 2:6–11 (he 
does not know that it is a hymn) and he has not clearly understood the 
literary unity of verses 6–11. He connects these verses to verse 5, which 
he interprets as a call to “be humble” and to “hold by experience what was 
in Christ Jesus.”3 The example of Christ (exemplum Christi) includes three 
moments: first, the majesty of Christ (Christi maiestas: Phil 2:6); second, 
his humility in his Incarnation and his Passion (eius humilitas: Phil 2:7–8); 
third, his exaltation (exaltatio: Phil 2:9–11). This ensemble is concluded 
by an exhortation to do the good according to the example of Christ, and 
thereby to accomplish the works of salvation (Phil 2:12–18). This final 
exhortation directly takes up the example of Christ: “Since Christ thus 
humbled himself and was exalted for it, you ought to realize that if you are 
humbled, you shall also be exalted.”4
Aquinas does not set in opposition (as is sometimes done today in the 
exegetical literature on Philippians 2:5–115) the Trinitarian and Christo-
logical interpretation on the one hand, and the moral or ethical interpreta-
tion on the other hand. His general framework is that of the exemplum of 
Christ (moral interpretation) which includes, at its center, the mysterium 
of Christ (Trinitarian and Christological interpretation).6 In Thomas’s 
exegesis, the Trinitarian and Christological doctrine of verses 6–11 finds a 
S. Centi, et al. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1965), 7–276 and 421–35. English 
translations of Aquinas’s Latin texts are taken, with modifications, from dhspriory.
org/thomas. Unless otherwise noted, other translations are my own.
2  See Gilbert Dahan, “L’exégèse médiévale de Philippiens 2, 5–11,” in Philippiens 
2, 5–11: La kénose du Christ, ed. Matthieu Arnold, Gilbert Dahan, and Annie 
Noblesse-Rocher, Études d’histoire de l’exégèse 6 (Paris: Cerf, 2013), 75–113, at 
77–84. See also Michel-Yves Perrin, “Variations tardo-antiques sur Philippiens 2, 
5–11,” in Arnold, Dahan, and Noblesse-Rocher, Philippiens 2, 5–11, 41–73, at 
45–46.
3  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 52): “Dicit ergo: sitis humiles, ut dixi, ideo hoc sentite, id 
est experimento tenete quod fuit in Christo Iesu.”
4  Super Phil 2, lec. 3 (no. 75).
5  Cf. Perrin, “Variations,” 51–54.
6  Super Phil 2, lec. 1 (no. 44); lec. 2 (nos. 51 and 56).
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place, by a kind of inclusio, within a moral exhortation (it is preceded and 
followed by ethical teaching) whose principal themes are the humility and 
obedience that should be present in the Christian community.7
In his commentary on St. Paul, Thomas identifies the subject of the 
kenosis as the person of Christ (Christus) according to his divinity (in 
forma Dei), that is to say the Son as “true God” (verus Deus) according to 
his “equality” (aequalitas) with the Father.8 In other places, he designates 
the subject of the kenosis as the “Word of God” (Verbum Dei),9 or the 
“Son of God” (Filius Dei),10 or even simply “God” (Deus).11 In accord 
with St. Cyril of Alexandria, the subject of the kenosis is also designated 
as the “Only-Begotten” (Unigenitus)12 or the “true Son of God” (verus Dei 
Filius).13 In every case, conforming to the tradition of interpretation domi-
nant among the pro-Nicene Fathers, the preexistence of the Son is clearly 
underlined: “It is said that he was in the form of God; therefore, he was in 
the form of God before taking the form of a servant.”14
In the exegesis of St. Thomas, the act of kenosis (v. 7: semetipsum 
exinanivit) concerns the “mystery of the Incarnation” (mysterium incar-
7  One finds a similar interpretation in the exegesis of the similar passage of 2 Corin-
thians 8:9 (“though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, so that by his 
poverty you might become rich”). Aquinas places at the forefront the exemplum of 
Christ (Super II Cor 8, lec. 2 [no. 294]), which he then develops in two ways (no. 
295): first, the exemplum properly so-called (moral interpretation); second, the 
sacramentum (the mystery of Christ the Savior). The binary sacramentum-exem-
plum is common in the patristic sources of St. Thomas, especially in St. Augustine 
and St. Leo the Great; for Augustine, see Albert Verwilghen, Christologie et spiritu-
alité selon saint Augustin: L’hymne aux Philippiens, Théologie historique 72 (Paris: 
Beauchesne, 1985), 295; for Leo, see Laurent Pidolle, La christologie historique du 
pape saint Léon le Grand, Cogitatio fidei 290 (Paris: Cerf, 2013), 107–108.
8  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 54).
9  See, for instance, SCG IV, ch. 34 (nos. 3715 and 3718).
10  See, for instance, De unione Verbi incarnati, a. 1, resp.
11  SCG IV, ch. 34 (no. 3721): “legitur quod Deus sit exinanitus, Philipp. 2,7, 
Exinanivit semetipsum [We read in Philippians (2:7) that God has been emptied: 
‘he emptied himself ’].”
12  Catena in Matt 1, lec. 1 (Marietti ed., 1:11). St. Cyril of Alexandria, First Letter to 
the monks of Egypt; English translation in John A. McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexan-
dria, The Christological Controversy: Its History, Theology, and Texts (Leiden: Brill, 
1994), 245–61, at 252 (see PG, 77:24).
13  Catena in Lucam 14, lec. 4 (Marietti ed., 2:207).
14  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 62): “dicitur cum in forma Dei esset. Ergo prius in forma 
Dei erat, quam acciperet formam servi.” Cf. SCG IV, ch. 34 (no. 3715): “[Phil 
2:6–7] must be understood of the Word of God who was first [prius] eternally 
in the form of God, that is, in the nature of God, and later [postmodum] emptied 
himself, made in the likeness of men.”
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nationis), while the humiliation of Christ (v. 8: humiliavit semetipsum) 
relates to the “mystery of his Passion” (mysterium passionis).15 Concerning 
the kenosis itself, Thomas’s exegesis proceeds in four steps that we may 
summarize in the following manner: (1) the self-emptying of the Son, (2) 
the personal identity of the Son who underwent kenosis, (3) the truth of 
Christ’s humanity and its kenotic conditions, and (4) the heresies to which 
Aquinas pays a special attention in his theological exegesis of Philippians 2.
“He Emptied Himself ”
The principal sources of medieval theologians concerning the exinanitio of 
Christ are St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, Ambrosiaster, and St. Gregory the 
Great.16 The exegesis of Thomas is not limited, however, to reprising that of 
his sources: it offers advances and shows originality on many points. First, 
Thomas clarifies the meaning of the verb exinanivit:
He emptied himself. But since he was filled with the divinity, did he 
empty himself of that? No, because he remained what he was; and 
what he was not, he assumed. But this must be understood in regard 
to the assumption of what he had not, and not according to the 
assumption of what he had. For just as he descended from heaven, 
not that he ceased to exist in heaven, but because he began to exist 
in a new way on earth, so he also emptied himself, not by putting off 
his divine nature, but by assuming a human nature.17
On the one hand, the divine immutability of the subject of the kenosis is 
clearly affirmed, in words that literally reprise the exegesis of St. Augustine 
and St. Leo the Great, in particular the formula “quod erat permansit et 
quod non erat, assumpsit” (“he remained what he was, and he assumed 
15  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 56). On Phil 2:7 as signifying the “mystery of the Incarna-
tion” (mysterium incarnationis), see also Catena in Marcum 1, lec. 12: “exinanitio-
nis, idest incarnationis mysterium” (Marietti ed., 1:443); Summa theologiae [ST] 
III, q. 39, a. 6, obj. 2.
16  See Dahan, “L’exégèse médiévale,” 76–77 and 92–93.
17  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 57): “Dicit ergo Sed semetipsum, etc. Sed quia erat plenus 
divinitate, numquid ergo evacuavit se divinitate? Non, quia quod erat permansit 
et quod non erat, assumpsit. Sed hoc est intelligendum secundum assumptionem 
eius quod non habuit, sed non secundum assumptionem eius quod habuit. Sicut 
enim descendit de caelo, non quod desineret esse in caelo, sed quia incepit esse 
novo modo in terris, sic etiam se exinanivit, non deponendo divinam naturam, sed 
assumendo naturam humanam.”
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what he was not”). 18 On the other hand, the kenosis is understood as the 
assumption of a human nature, that is to say, as the Incarnation. In many 
other passages, Thomas expressly identifies the exinanitio of Philippians 
2:6–7 with the hypostatic union19 or the Incarnation.20 In his commentary 
on the Epistle to the Philippians, Aquinas understands the exinanitio as 
the “Incarnation”21 or the “union in the person.”22 Because the exinanitio 
involves no modification, loss, or diminution of the divinity of the Son, it 
is necessary therefore to specify in what sense the Incarnation is an exinan-
itio. Here is Thomas’s explanation:
[The Apostle] beautifully says that [Christ] emptied himself, for the 
empty is opposed to the full. For the divine nature is adequately 
full, because every perfection of goodness is there. But human 
nature, as well as the soul, is not full, but in potency to fullness, 
because it was made as a slate not written upon. Therefore, human 
nature is empty. Hence he says, he emptied himself, because he 
18  According to Verwilghen, this is “the most global and most general formula” 
used by St. Augustine for defining the forma servi in the kenosis (Christologie et 
spiritualité, 209). For the use of the same formula by Leo the Great, see Pidolle, La 
christologie historique, 93.
19  See, for instance, Compendium theologiae I, ch. 203: “Hanc enim unionem Dei et 
hominis Apostolus exinanitionem nominat, dicens Phil. II de Filio Dei ‘Qui cum 
in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se equalem Deo, sed semet 
ipsum exinaniuit formam serui accipiens (This union of God and man [in the 
Incarnate Son] is called by the Apostle an ‘emptying’; in Philippians 2:6 he says 
of the Son of God: ‘Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be 
equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant’)’” (Leonine ed., 
42:159). The same statement is found in the question De unione Verbi incarnati, 
a. 1, resp. (“Apostolus ad Philipp. hanc unionem exinanitionem Filii Dei vocat [In 
the letter to the Philippians, the Apostle calls this union an emptying of the Son of 
God]”) and in Super Ioan 1, lec. 7 (no. 176, on John 1:14: “Apostolus enim Phil. II 
unionem Dei et hominis exinanitionem vocat [The Apostle calls the union of God 
and man an emptying]”). See also Super Col 2, lec. 2 (no. 98).
20  See, for instance, SCG IV, ch. 27 (no. 3636). Aquinas indicates here two biblical 
passages that bear witness to the revelation of the Incarnation (“Hanc autem Dei 
incarnationem mirabilem auctoritate divina tradente, confitemur [We confess this 
marvelous Incarnation of God, which divine authority hands down]”): John 1:14 
and Phil 2:6–7.
21  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 62): “Apostolus incarnationem nominat exinanitionem 
(The Apostle calls the Incarnation an emptying)” (see also no. 56).
22  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 62): “Ipse semetipsum exinanivit, ergo est unio in persona 
(He himself emptied himself: therefore, the union is in the person).”
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assumed a human nature.23
The exegesis of Thomas is completely literal: the verb exinanire is under-
stood to the letter as “to become empty.” Therefore, semetipsum exinanivit 
signifies: “he emptied himself.” Aquinas also knows the word vacuatum 
(literally: “made empty”) as an equivalent to exinanitus.24 This exegesis is 
not common among Aquinas’s contemporaries. Its originality consists first 
in opposing the “emptiness” of the humanity to the “fullness” of the divin-
ity (cf. Col 2:9), and second in understanding this “emptiness” as signifying 
the potentiality of the soul or the human nature with respect to the acqui-
sition or reception of a perfection or plenitude. Certainly, Aquinas does 
not reduce human nature to the soul (since human nature consists in the 
substantial union of the soul and the body), nor does he reduce the soul 
to the intellect, but he “pulls” human nature somewhat toward the soul, 
in order to make the most of the Aristotelian doctrine of the tabula rasa 
that he applies to the intellect (and by extension to the soul), and in order 
to show that the human nature is “empty” as a tabula rasa. The expression 
tabula rasa is not very frequent in Aquinas: when Thomas cites Aristotle 
from De anima 3.4.430a1, he omits the adjective rasa.25 This expression 
first relates to the possible intellect. It signifies that, before understanding 
in actuality, the intellect is in potency in relation to intelligibles “like a 
tablet on which nothing is written in act, but several [things] can be writ-
ten on it; and this also happens in the possible intellect, because no intel-
ligible is in it in act, but only in potency.”26 On this basis, we should note 
23  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 57): “Pulchre autem dicit exinanivit. Inane enim opponitur 
pleno. Natura autem divina satis plena est, quia ibi est omnis bonitatis perfectio. 
Ex. XXXIII: Ostendam tibi omne bonum. Natura autem humana, et anima non est 
plena, sed in potentia ad plenitudinem; quia est facta quasi tabula rasa. Est ergo 
natura humana inanis. Dicit ergo exinanivit, quia naturam humanam assumpsit.”
24  Catena in Matt 1, lec. 1 (Marietti ed., 1:11).
25  The Latin translation of Aristotle on which Thomas comments in his In de anima 
is the following: “Potencia quodam modo est intelligibilia intellectus, set actu 
nichil, ante quam intelligat. Oportet autem sic sicut in tabula nichil est actu scrip-
tum, quod quidem accidit in intellectu” (Leonine ed., 45/1:214). This text can be 
translated as follows: “The intellect is, in a way, potentially all intelligibles; but it is 
actually nothing [of them] until it understands. What happens in the intellect has 
to be like [what happens on] a tablet on which nothing is actually written upon. 
For the sources of Thomas and the parallel places, see the long note by the Leonine 
editor, Fr. René-Antoine Gauthier (Leonine ed., 45/1:215).
26  In III de anima, ch. 3 (Leonine ed., 45/1:215): “Intellectus igitur dicitur pati in 
quantum est quodam modo in potencia ad intelligibilia, et nichil eorum est actu, 
ante quam intelligat. Oportet autem sic esse sicut contingit in tabula in qua nichil 
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that Aquinas often uses the word “intellect” for “soul” by synecdoche (that 
is, when the name of a part is used to refer to the whole). In the Summa 
theologiae [ST], for instance, before showing that the soul’s powers differ 
from the soul’s essence,27 Aquinas writes that “the human soul . . . is called 
the intellect or the mind.”28 And even when the soul is distinguished from 
the possible intellect, we speak of the soul in the light of what we know 
about its powers.29 In this way, potency applying to the possible intellect 
is extended to the soul. Further, such attribution of potency to the soul is 
consistent with Aquinas’s teaching, since the human soul, though being 
the act of the body (according to Aristotle, the soul is defined as “the first 
act of a physical organized body having life potentially”30), still remains 
in potency under two aspects: first, with regard to its operations;31 and 
second, with regard to the act of being (esse).32 And therefore, since not 
only the body but the soul as well is marked by a potency, human nature 
est actu scriptum, set plura possunt in ea scribi; et hoc etiam accidit in intellectu 
possibili, quia nichil intelligibilium est in eo actu, set in potencia tantum (The 
intellect is called passive insofar as it is, in a way, in potency to intelligible [objects], 
and nothing of them is actual [in the intellect] until it understands. It is like a tablet 
on which nothing is yet written, but many [things] can be written. What happens 
in the possible intellect has to be like what happens on a tablet on which nothing is 
actually written upon, but many [things] can be written on it. And this also happens 
in the possible intellect, because nothing of the intelligibles is in it actually, but only 
in potency).” See also ST I, q. 79, a. 2, resp.; q. 101, a. 1, sc.).
27  ST I, q. 77.
28  ST I, q. 75, a. 2, resp.: “Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellec-
tus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens.”
29  Cf. ST I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 7.
30  See, for instance, SCG II, ch. 61 (no. 1397): “Aristoteles . . . definit animam dicens 
quod est actus primus physici corporis organici potentia vitam habentis.”
31  ST I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 1: “Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, 
but ‘the act of a physical organized body having life potentially.’ . . . The soul is 
said to be the ‘act of a body, etc.’ because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, 
and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potency to the second act, 
which is operation [actus primus dicitur in potentia respectu actus secundi, qui est 
operatio]; for such a potency [talis enim potentia] ‘does not reject’—that is, does 
not exclude—the soul.”
32  ST I, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4: “Everything participated is compared to the participator as its 
act [omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus eius]. But whatever created 
form be supposed to subsist ‘per se,’ must have existence by participation. . . . Now 
participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, 
who is his own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances there 
is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of 
form and participated existence [in substantiis vero intellectualibus est compositio ex 
actu et potentia; non quidem ex materia et forma, sed ex forma et esse participato].”
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clearly appears to be “in potency to fullness,” in such a way that the tabula 
rasa which characterizes the possible intellect is extended to human nature.
So, applied to the Incarnation, this example means that the kenosis of the 
Son of God concerns not only the assumption of a human nature, but also 
the human nature itself that, in itself, is characterized by a state of “empti-
ness.” And in this manner, the Incarnation understood as the assumption of 
a human nature can indeed be understood as a “self-emptying.”
The Personal Identity of the Incarnate Son
Aquinas constantly insists, in a notable and oft-repeated manner, on the 
personal identity of the subject and the term of the kenosis. His exegesis is 
resolutely anti-Nestorian: this is one of its most striking characteristics for 
us today. Aquinas denies that, in his exinanitio, the Son assumed a human 
person or hypostasis. He perceives an indication of this in the fact that 
the Pauline text does not say “taking a servant” or “taking a slave” (servum 
accipiens),33 but “taking the form of a servant” (formam servi accipiens). The 
forma servi does not mean a human supposit, but a human nature: “human 
nature is the form of a servant.”34 The kenosis of Philippians 2:7 therefore 
means: “He took a [human] nature into his own person, so that the Son of 
God and the son of man would be one in person.”35
In accord with the heresiological tradition transmitted by St. Cyril of 
Alexandria and the Council of Constantinople II,36 Thomas identifies 
“Nestorianism” with the doctrine of “two sons” (one is the Son of God and 
the other is a human son, that is to say: one is the person of the Son and the 
other is the person of the man Jesus), implying that the Incarnation would 
be accomplished by an “inhabitation,” by grace, of the hypostasis of the 
Son in a human hypostasis.37 This is the principal error that Thomas seeks 
33  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 58): “Servant [servus] is the name of a hypostasis or of a 
supposit, which was not assumed, but the nature was; for that which is assumed 
is distinct from the one assuming it. Therefore, the Son of God did not assume a 
man, because that would lead to understand that [this] man was someone else than 
the Son of God.”
34  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 58): “natura humana est forma servi.”
35  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 58): “Accepit ergo naturam in persona sua, ut esset idem in 
persona Filius Dei et filius hominis.” Cf. ST III, q. 17, obj. 1, obj. 2, ad 1, and ad 2.
36  The thought of Nestorius himself is more complex: see André de Halleux, “Nesto-
rius: Histoire et doctrine,” Irénikon 66 (1993): 38–51 and 163–78.
37  ST III, q. 2, a. 6, resp.: “Alia vero fuit haeresis Nestorii et Theodori Mopsuesteni 
separantium personas. Posuerunt enim aliam esse personam Filii Dei, et filii homi-
nis. Quas dicebant sibi invicem esse unitas, primo quidem, secundum inhabitatio-
nem, inquantum scilicet verbum Dei habitavit in illo homine sicut in templo (The 
other heresy was the one of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated 
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constantly to avoid when he explains the meaning of Philippians 2:7. This 
point should be noted, because it shows that Aquinas’s central concern, in 
his interpretation of the kenosis, differs notably from our contemporary 
preoccupations: in many places, when Aquinas refers to Philippians 2:7, 
he denies that the Incarnation boils down to an “inhabitation by grace.” 
And this is precisely the reason why he judges that the idea of a “kenosis 
of the Father” or a “kenosis of the Holy Spirit” is “false” ( falsum)38 or even 
“absurd” (absurdum).39 The Father and the Holy Spirit dwell in the saints 
by grace, but the Father and the Holy Spirit are not incarnate. Aquinas is 
very clear: the kenosis is (1) proper to the Son, to the exclusion of the Father 
and the Holy Spirit, and (2) proper to the Son in his Incarnation. More-
over, since according to Thomas (who here follows St. Cyril of Alexandria) 
the “Nestorian” understanding of Christ introduces a separation between 
the persons. For they held the person of the Son of God and the person of the Son 
of man to be different, and said these were mutually united: first, ‘by indwelling,’ 
inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in this man as in a temple).” On this, see 
Martin Morard, “Une source de saint Thomas d’Aquin: le deuxième Concile de 
Constantinople (553),” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 81 (1997): 
21–56, at 43. Concerning typical formulae such as habitavit sicut in templo, or 
sicut et in aliis hominibus, Morard also notes (at 26) the influence of Pope Vigilius’s 
Constitutum I (cf. Denzinger, no. 417).
38  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 62): “Constat autem quod Pater inhabitat et Spiritus 
Sanctus: ergo et isti sunt exinaniti, quod est falsum (It is clear that the Father 
indwells [in the saints], and the Holy Spirit [indwells] as well; therefore, they too 
are emptied: which is false).”
39  Super Rom. 1, lec. 2 (no. 35): “Nestorius taught that the union of the Word with 
human nature consisted solely in an indwelling [inhabitatio], in the sense that the 
Son of God dwelt in that man more fully than in others. . . . This is shown to be 
false [falsum] by that fact that the Apostle in Philippians 2[:7] calls this sort of 
union an emptying of himself [unionem huiusmodi vocat exinanitionem]. But since 
the Father and the Holy Spirit dwell in men [inhabitant homines], as the Lord says 
in John 14[:23]—‘We will come to him and make our home with him’—it would 
follow that they, too, would be emptying themselves [essent exinaniti]; which is 
absurd [quod est absurdum].” The same argument is developed at great length in 
Compendium theologiae  I, ch. 203: “Otherwise the Father and the Holy Spirit 
would also be emptied [exinanirentur], since they too dwell in the rational creature 
by grace [creaturam rationalem per gratiam inhabitant].” See also: Super Ioan 1, 
lec. 7 (no. 176) (“quia sic Pater et Spiritus Sanctus exinanirentur [because then the 
Father and the Holy Spirit would be emptied]”); De unione Verbi incarnati, a. 1, 
resp. (“Inhabitatio gratiae non sufficit ad rationem exinanitionis. Alioquin exinan-
itio competeret non solum Filio, sed etiam Patri et Spiritui Sancto [the indwelling 
of grace is not enough to account for the notion of ‘emptying.’ Otherwise empty-
ing would belong not only the Son, but also to the Father and the Holy Spirit]”); 
Catena in Matt 1, lec. 1 (Marietti ed., 1:11).
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the Word and the man, the “Nestorian” view would mean that the subject 
of the exinanitio is not a divine person but, rather the human person of 
the man Jesus (“it was the man who underwent kenosis”40), a position that 
Aquinas excludes firmly.
All this shows that, in the kenosis of Philippians 2:7, Aquinas under-
stands very precisely the Incarnation of the Son, with an anti-Nestorian 
accent placed upon the personal identity and unity of the subject of the 
kenosis: “He emptied himself: therefore it is the same who ‘was emptied’ 
and who ‘emptied’ [himself]. And this is the Son, because he himself 
emptied himself; therefore, the union is in the person.”41 This same exegesis, 
with the same anti-Nestorian concern, is found in the interpretation of 
John 1:14, Philippians 2:7, and Colossians 2:9.42
The Truth of Christ’s Humanity, and Its Kenotic Conditions
In his exegesis of Philippians 2:6–8, Thomas underlines the truth of the 
humanity assumed (the forma servi) and its conditions. The truth of the 
body of Christ and of his human soul is often emphasized,43 as well as the 
ordinary way he lived as a man among men.44 For Aquinas, Christ’s forma 
servi implies not only that, as man, Christ was obedient to his heavenly 
Father, but also that he was obedient to his parents (during his childhood) 
and that he was subject to the governing authorities: he lived under the 
40  Catena in Matt 1, lec. 1 (Marietti ed., 1:11): “The Apostle says in regard to the 
Only Begotten: ‘Who being in the form of God did not count equality with God 
a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself.’ Who is it, then, who is ‘in the form of 
God’? Or in what manner is he ‘emptied out’? Or how did he descend to humil-
iation in the ‘form of a slave’? There are some [heretics] who divide the one Lord 
Jesus Christ into two, that is into a man alongside the Word [in duo dividentes 
Christum, idest in hominem et Verbum]. These people maintain that it was the man 
who underwent the ‘emptying out’ [hominem dicunt sustinuisse exinanitionem], 
and in this way they separate him from the Word of God.” This is taken from St. 
Cyril of Alexandria, First Letter to the monks of Egypt, in McGuckin, St. Cyril of 
Alexandria, 252 (see PG, 77:24). This Letter dates from the spring of 429, when 
St. Cyril had heard of Nestorius’s teaching infiltrating Egypt; it is especially inter-
esting, since it “marks the opening of the Nestorian controversy” (McGuckin, St. 
Cyril of Alexandria, 245n1).
41  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 62): “Item dicit: Semetipsum exinanivit, ergo idem est qui 
exinanitus est, et exinaniens. Sed huiusmodi est Filius Dei, quia ipse semetipsum 
exinanivit, ergo est unio in persona” (the emphases in the translation are mine).
42   See Gilles Emery, Présence de Dieu et union à Dieu: Création, inhabitation par 
grâce, incarnation et vision bienheureuse selon saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Cerf, 
2017), 133–40.
43  See, for instance: ST III, q. 5, ad 2; q. 14, a. 1, resp.
44  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 60); Super Ioan 2, lec. 13 (no. 246).
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Law (sub lege, in reference to Gal 4:4). The concrete and historical integrity 
of Christ’s humanity is well shown.45
On the one hand, Aquinas observes the “conformity of nature” between 
the man Christ and other men, in reference to Hebrews 2:17 (“Therefore 
he had to become like his brothers in every respect, so that he might be a 
merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God”).46 This teaching 
appears again in the preaching of Aquinas:
Christ wanted to be conformed to others. This is why St. Paul 
[wrote] to the Philippians: “he emptied himself, taking the form of 
a servant, being made in the likeness of men.” Christ made himself 
small by taking our smallness [Christus se paruum fecit nostram 
paruitatem accipiendo]. And so as to show himself really small 
[paruum uere], he was made in the likeness of men.47
This conformity calls to mind the theme of Christ as “Head” of the Church, 
in the measure to which the notion of “Head,” applied to Christ, implies a 
conformity of nature with his members. In his writings prior to the Summa 
theologiae, Thomas emphasizes with great insistence the conformity of nature 
between Christ the Head and his members.48 And in this context, he makes 
reference to Philippians 2: “In the head is found a conformity of nature 
[conformitas naturae] to the other members; likewise in Christ with respect 
to other men, as it says in Phil 2[:7]: ‘Taking the form of a servant, being born 
in the likeness of men, and being found in human form.’”49 This exegesis of 
Philippians 2:7 reprises that of St. Augustine.50 If one follows the progression 
of Aquinas’s works, however, this theme of the “conformity of nature” loses 
importance in his manner of rendering account of Christ as Head, and this 
theme finally only occupies a very marginal place in the Summa theologiae.51
45  Super Gal. 4, lec. 1 (no. 195): “As man, he seemed to differ nothing from a servant. 
Phil. II: ‘He emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the like-
ness of men, and in habit found as a man.’ Furthermore, he was under tutors and 
governors [sub tutoribus autem et actoribus], because he was made under the Law 
[sub lege factus erat] . . . and was also subject to men, as is said in Luke II[:51]: ‘He 
was subject to them.’”
46  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 59).
47  Sermon Puer Iesus (Leonine ed., 44/1:104).
48  See In III sent., d. 13, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, resp.; De veritate, q. 29, a. 4, sc 2 and resp.; 
Super Col 2, lec. 2 (no. 100); Compendium theologiae I, ch. 214.
49  Super I Cor 11, lec. 1 (no. 587).
50  See Verwilghen, Christologie et spiritualité, 282–84.
51  In q. 8 of the tertia pars of ST, the conformity of nature no longer intervenes in a 
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On the other hand, Thomas applies himself to showing the “conditions” 
(conditiones) of the humanity assumed. This is an important point in Aqui-
nas’s understanding of the kenosis: not only has the Son of God assumed 
a human nature, but “he assumed all the defects and properties associated 
with the human species, except sin [defectus omnes et proprietates continen-
tes speciem, praeter peccatum]; therefore, St. Paul says, ‘and being found in 
human form,’ namely, in his external life, because he became hungry as a 
man, and tired, and so on: ‘One who in every respect has been tempted as 
we are, yet without sinning’ (Heb 4:15); ‘Afterward [he] appeared upon 
earth and lived among men’ (Bar 3:37).”52 The exinanitio of Christ thus 
includes all that, in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas treats under the rubric 
of “defects” of the body (defectus corporis) and of the soul (defectus animae) 
that Christ voluntarily assumed, that is to say, his corporeal passibility, the 
innocent passions of his soul, and all that concerns his state of viator (ST 
III, qq. 14–15).53
The exegesis of the word habitus in Philippians 2:7 (et habitu inventus ut 
homo: “being found in human form”; literally “and in habit found as man”) 
furnishes the occasion for two clarifications. First, Aquinas denies that 
the subject of the kenosis (the Son of God) has undergone a change with 
respect to his form of God. Second, Aquinas denies that the Incarnation 
has not brought about a change in the human nature assumed by the Son 
of God: the assumed human nature has indeed undergone a change (muta-
tio) in the sense that, by virtue of the union in the person of the Son, this 
human nature “was changed for the better [mutata est in melius], because 
it was filled with grace and truth: ‘We have beheld his glory, glory as of the 
only Son from the Father’ (John 1:14).”54
Against Heresies
Before turning to the Passion of Christ (Phil 2:8: humiliavit semetip-
significant manner, and it is displaced in the discussion of Christ as Head of the 
angels (ST III, q. 8, a. 4, obj. 1 and ad 1).
52  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 60). Cf. ST III, q. 14, a. 1, resp. (with reference to Phil 2:7).
53  See, for instance, ST III, q. 14, a. 1, resp. (on the bodily defects assumed by Christ): 
“It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to be subject to human 
infirmities and defects [humanis infirmitatibus et defectibus].” Here Aquinas 
mentions three “reasons of fittingness” for this: first, satisfaction for sin, by the 
assumption of poenalitates due for original sin (“death, hunger, thirst, and the 
like, are the punishment of sin”); second, enhancement of faith in the Incarnation 
(with reference to Phil 2:7); third, an example of patience “by valiantly bearing up 
against human passibility and defects.”
54  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 61).
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sum), the exegesis of Philippians 2:7 on “the mystery of the Incarnation” 
concludes with a discussion of the errors to which this verse has given rise.55 
First of all, the interpretation of the word habitus in Philippians 2:7 leads 
Aquinas to exclude the third Christological opinion reported by Peter 
Lombard in distinction 6 of the third book of the Sentences,56 namely the 
“habitus theory” of the Incarnation. Thomas summarizes and refutes it 
thus: according to this opinion, “Christ’s humanity accrues to him as an 
accident [accidentaliter]. This is false, because the supposit of divine nature 
became a supposit of human nature [suppositum divinae naturae factum 
est suppositum humanae naturae]; therefore, it [the humanity] is united to 
him [the supposit of divine nature] not as an accident, but substantially 
[substantialiter].”57 We find here a summary of his interpretation of Philip-
pians 2:6–7. The Son is united to a humanity in the unity of his divine 
person (in this context, substantialiter means “personally” or “hypostati-
cally”), of such a kind that the incarnate Son is a single and identical person 
who subsists in two natures. Philippians 2:6–7 excludes a fortiori any form 
of adoptionism, because a union to God by the habitation of grace would 
be an “accidental” union.58
For Aquinas, the formulations of Philippians 2:6–8 exclude all the 
principal Christological errors. Thus, the correct understanding of the 
habitus and the phrase cum in forma Dei esset (which signifies the preex-
istence of the divine subject of the kenosis) excludes adoptionism (error 
Photini).59 The expression non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo 
excludes the error of Arius, which Thomas defines here as the inequality of 
the Son in relation to the Father (minor Patre).60 With regard to the phrase 
semetipsum exinanivit, as we have seen, it excludes Nestorianism (error 
Nestorii), since this phrase signifies “union in the person.” In his exegesis 
of Philippians 2:6–8, it is incontestably to Nestorianism (and to the erro-
neous theory of the Incarnation as inhabitation by grace) that Aquinas is 
55  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 62).
56  See: In III sent., d. 6, q. 3; ST III, q. 2, aa. 5–6.
57  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 62).
58  On Phil 2:6–7 as excluding adoptionism, see also SCG IV, ch. 4 (no. 3369) and ch. 
28 (no. 3643).
59  See Gilles Emery, “Le photinisme et ses précurseurs chez saint Thomas: Cérinthe, 
les ébionites, Paul de Samosate et Photin,” Revue thomiste 95 (1995): 371–98.
60  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 62): it is according to his forma servi, that is to say his 
humanity, that Christ is inferior to the Father (see John 14:28: “the Father is 
greater than I”), and not according to his form of God; because according to the 
forma Dei, the Son is perfectly equal to the Father (no. 55). See also: SCG IV, ch. 
8 (no. 3430); Super Ioan 14, lec. 8 (no. 1970).
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opposed the most often, and with the greatest number of details.61 In the 
same way, the words formam servi accipiens exclude Monophysitism (error 
Eutichetis).62 Lastly, the expressions in similitudinem hominum factus 
and habitu inventus ut homo exclude the Gnostic dualism that did not 
recognize the true humanity of the body of Christ (error Valentini: Christ 
would have taken his body from heaven),63 as well as Apollinarianism 
(error Apollinaris: Christ would not have had an intellectual soul, which is 
excluded by the words in similitudinem hominum factus).
This list may appear “Scholastic,” and it certainly corresponds to a 
didactic intention.64 More profoundly, however, it shows two principal 
things: first, for Aquinas, Philippians 2:6–7 offers complete teaching about 
the Incarnation; second, Thomas is convinced that the exegesis that he has 
set forth on the basis of his patristic sources is perfectly sure and safe, to 
the point that the correct interpretation of these verses of St. Paul permits 
the theologian to accomplish the twofold task of the sage: not only to 
make manifest the truth, but also to exclude errors (because the exclusion 
of errors is part of the manifestation of the truth).65
Complements of Doctrinal Exegesis
In order to grasp well Aquinas’s understanding of Philippians 2:6–7, we 
61  Besides the passages mentioned above, see also, concerning Nestorius (and Theo-
dorus of Mopsuestia) with reference to Phil 2:6–8: SCG IV, ch. 34 (nos. 3715 and 
3718); Compendium theologiae I, ch. 203; De unione Verbi incarnati, a. 1, resp.; 
Catena in Matt 1, lec. 1 (Marietti ed., 1:11); Super Ioan 1, lec. 7 (no. 176); Super 
Col 2, lec. 2 (no. 98).
62  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 62): “[This excludes] also the error of Eutyches, who 
said that from the two natures one nature only resulted. Therefore [according to 
Eutyches] Christ did not take the form of a servant, but a different one, which 
is contrary to what the Apostle says.” On Phil 2:6–7 as excluding the error of 
Eutyches, see also De articulis fidei et Ecclesiae sacramentis (Leonine ed., 42:251).
63   On Phil 2:6–7 as excluding Valentinus’s error about the Incarnation, see also SCG 
IV, ch. 30 (no. 3668).
64  The list of errors discussed in Aquinas’s commentary on Phil 2:6–7 is also found 
in his treatise De articulis fidei et Ecclesiae sacramentis, in the section on Christ’s 
humanity (humanitas Christi); however, this treatise adds other errors: those of 
the Manichaeans (distinguished from the Valentinians), of the Monothelites, of 
Carpocrates, and of Elvidius (Leonine ed., 42:250–51). For Aquinas’s sources on 
these heresies, see Aquinas, Traités: Les raisons de la foi, Les articles de la foi et les 
sacrements de l’Église, trans. Gilles Emery with introduction and annotation (Paris: 
Cerf, 1999), 206–8.
65  In SCG I, ch. 1 (no. 7), Aquinas explains that the “twofold office of the wise man” 
(duplex sapientis officium) is “to meditate and speak forth of the divine truth” and 
“to refute the opposing errors.”
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provide here three complements drawn from his other works. First, in 
numerous places, Thomas is very firm regarding the immutability and 
inviolable permanence of the divine nature of the Son in his exinanitio. 
In emptying himself, the Son took the form of a slave “without losing his 
divine nature,”66 “not by changing his own nature.”67 “He did not lose the 
fullness of the form of God,”68 since “the glorification did not absorb the 
lesser nature, nor did the assumption lessen the higher.”69 As a summary: 
“He is not said to have ‘emptied himself ’ by diminishing his divine nature, 
but by assuming our deficient nature.”70 Aquinas accords great importance 
to this aspect, so much so that he mentions it, in citing the Tome to Flavian 
of St. Leo the Great, in the opening lines of the praefatio of his Catena 
aurea: “That self-emptying (exinanitio) whereby the Invisible made himself 
66  SCG IV, ch. 30 (no. 3668): “formam servi accepit, ita tamen quod divinitatis natu-
ram non perdidit.” See Augustine’s quote in the Catena in Ioan 14, lec. 8 (Marietti 
ed., 2:525): “Ipse ergo Filius Dei aequalis Patri in forma Dei, quia semetipsum 
exinanivit, non formam Dei amittens, sed formam servi accipiens (The Son of 
God, being equal to the Father in the form of God, emptied himself, not losing the 
form of God, but taking that of a servant).” Cf. Augustine, Tractatus in Iohannis 
Evangelium 78.1 (Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina [CCSL], 36:523).
67  SCG IV, ch. 34 (no. 3715): “non mutatione propriae naturae.”
68  ST III, q. 5, a. 1, ad 2: “formae Dei plenitudinem non amisit.” Under the name 
of St. Augustine, Aquinas here quotes Fulgentius of Ruspe, De fide ad Petrum 
21 (with reference to Phil 2:7); cf. Fulgentius of Ruspe, Opera, ed. Jean Fraipont, 
CCSL  91A:725: “Exinaniens ergo semetipsum, formam serui accepit, ut fieret 
seruus; sed formae Dei plenitudinem non amisit, in qua semper est aeternus atque 
incommutabilis Dominus (Emptying himself, he took the form of a slave, so as to 
become a slave; but he did not lose the fullness of the form of God, in which he is 
always the eternal and immutable Lord).” See also ST III, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2.
69  ST III, q. 5, a. 1, obj. 2: “nec inferiorem naturam consumpsit glorificatio, nec supe-
riorem minuit assumptio” (Aquinas here quotes St. Leo the Great, Sermon 1 on the 
Nativity of the Lord; cf. Sources chrétiennes [SCh] 22a:70–71).
70  In de div. nom. 2, lec. 5 (no. 207): “Communicavit nobis, assumens nostram natu-
ram absque variatione divinae naturae et absque commixtione ipsius et confusione 
ad humanam naturam, ita quod per exinanitionem ineffabilem, de qua Apostolus 
loquitur ad Philipp. II, nihil passus est ad superplenum ipsius, idest nihil diminutum 
est de plenitudine suae deitatis: non enim dicitur exinanitus per diminutionem 
deitatis, sed per assumptionem nostrae naturae deficientis (He communicated 
with us by assuming our nature, without the divine nature being changed, and 
without confusion of the divine nature and human nature. And so, by the ineffable 
emptying of which the Apostle speaks in Philippians 2, he suffered no damage as to 
his superplenitude, that is, nothing was subtracted from the plenitude of his divin-
ity. He is not said to have emptied himself by diminishing his divine nature, but by 
assuming our deficient nature).” In this reading, Philippians 2:6–7 is understood 
as a foundation for the Christological dogma of Chalcedon.
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visible, and the Creator and Lord of all things chose to join the ranks of 
mortals, was an act of mercy [inclinatio fuit miserationis], not a failure of 
his power [non desertio potestatis].”71 Unsurprisingly, Philippians 2:6–7 is 
invoked as biblical teaching supporting the communication of idioms:72 
“He who is in the form of God is man. Now he who is in the form of God 
is God. Therefore God is man.”73 Aquinas makes equally clear that the 
exinanitio is a voluntary act of the Son who becomes incarnate, just as it is 
a voluntary act of the Father who sends the Son.74
Second, again in many places, Aquinas’s interpretation of Philippians 
2:6–7 employs the vocabulary of “divine missions.” This vocabulary is 
already found in his patristic sources.75 In his theological account of the 
missions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Aquinas explains that “the 
[divine] person who is sent does not begin to exist where he did not previ-
ously exist, nor cease to exist where he was,” but this divine person “begins 
71  Catena aurea, Praefatio (Marietti ed., 1:5). Regrettably, the Catena omits the 
beginning of St. Leo’s sentence: “He took on the form of a servant without the 
defilement of sin, thereby enhancing the human and not diminishing the divine 
[humana augens, divina non minuens]”; see Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. 
Norman P. Tanner, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 
78.
72  SCG IV, ch. 34 (no. 3721).
73  ST III, q. 16, a. 1, sc (with explicit reference to Phil 2:6–7).
74  Catena in Marcum 1, lec. 12 (Marietti ed., 1:443; quoting St. John Chrysostom): 
“‘That is why I have come’ (Mark 1:38). . . . In these words he manifests the mystery 
of his ‘emptying himself,’ that is, of his incarnation [exinanitionis, idest incarna-
tionis mysterium], and the sovereignty of his divine nature, in that he here asserts 
that he came willingly into the world. Luke however says ‘To this end was I sent 
(missus sum)’ (Luke 4:43), which indicates the economy [dispensationem], and the 
good will of God the Father concerning the incarnation of the Son.” Cf. Catena 
in Lucam 4, lec. 10 (Marietti ed., 2:71; quoting an unidentified Greek author): 
“Mark says, ‘to this I came’ [ad hoc veni], showing the loftiness of his divine nature 
[divinitatis eius celsitudinem] and his voluntary emptying himself of it [voluntar-
iam exinanitionem].”
75  See, for instance, Catena in Lucam 14, lec. 4 (Marietti ed., 2:207; quoting St. 
Cyril): “Iste servus qui missus est, ipse Christus est, qui cum esset naturaliter Deus, 
et verus Dei Filius, exinanivit seipsum formam servi accipiens (That servant who 
was sent is Christ himself, who being by nature God and the true Son of God, 
emptied himself, taking the form of a servant).” See also Catena in Marcum 1, lec. 
12 (see note 74 above), and Catena in Ioan 6, lec. 9 (Marietti ed., 2:427, quoting 
Augustine’s Tractatus XXVI,19 on John’s Gospel): “If we understand the words ‘I 
live by the Father’ in the sense of those below, ‘My Father is greater than I,’ then it is 
as if [Christ] said that ‘I live by the Father,’ i.e., I refer my life to him as to a greater 
life: this was done by my self-emptying, in which he sent me [exinanitio mea fecit, 
in qua me misit].”
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to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto,” so that the 
divine person’s mission means “a new way of existing in another.”76 These 
expressions and other similar ones (“he did not desert heaven, but he 
assumed a terrestrial nature in unity of person”77) are employed precisely 
for explaining the meaning of Philippians 2:6–7.78 This leads to appre-
hending Philippians 2:6–7 in the sense of the Incarnation understood as 
the “visible mission” of the Son.
Third, in accord with contexts, Thomas employs other expressions 
for describing the exinanitio. For example, the Arian controversy over 
John 14:28 (“the Father is greater than I”) leads Aquinas to speak of the 
exinanitio as minoratio of the Son: the Son “was lessened (minoratum) by 
assuming the form of a servant, in such a way, however, that he exists as 
equal to the Father in the divine form, as it is said in Philippians 2.”79 In 
his anti-Arian exegesis, Thomas associates this “lessening” (cf. John 14:28) 
with Hebrews 2:9: “Nor is it wondrous if . . . the Father is said to be greater 
than he; since he was made lesser than the angels, as the Apostle says: ‘We 
see Jesus, who was made a little lesser [minoratus] than the angels, for the 
suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor.’”80 In the same sense, 
Aquinas explains that, in his kenosis, “the Word of God emptied himself, 
that is to say, was made small [parvum factum], not by the loss of his own 
greatness, but by the assumption of human smallness [humana parvi-
tas].”81 Or again: “He is said to have emptied himself [dicitur exinanitus], 
not by losing his fullness, but because he took our littleness upon himself 
76  ST I, q. 43, a. 1, resp. and ad 2.
77  ST III, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2: “Sicut enim dicitur exinanitus, non ex eo quod suam 
plenitudinem amitteret, sed ex eo quod nostram parvitatem suscepit; ita dicitur 
descendisse de caelo, non quia caelum deseruerit, sed quia naturam terrenam 
assumpsit in unitatem personae (For just as he is said to be emptied, not by losing 
his fullness, but because he took our smallness upon himself, so likewise he is said 
to have descended from heaven: he did not desert heaven, but he assumed a terres-
trial nature in unity of person).”
78  See, for instance, In III sent., d. 22, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2: “Dicitur . . . descendisse secun-
dum divinam naturam inquantum se exinanivit formam servi accipiens, Phil. II, et 
inquantum per novum effectum fuit in terris, secundum quem ibi ante non fuerat 
(He is said to have descended from heaven . . . according to his divine nature, inso-
far as he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant (Phil 2:7), and insofar as he 
was on earth by reason of this new effect, an effect by which he was not on earth 
before).”
79  SCG IV, ch. 8 (no. 3430); see also Super Boetium de Trinitate, q. 3, a. 4, ad 1.
80  SCG IV, ch. 8 (no. 3430).
81  SCG IV, ch. 34 (no. 3715).
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[nostram parvitatem suscepit].”82 The exinanitio understood as the assump-
tion of the “smallness” of our human condition is a constant interpretation 
of Thomas, which one finds in numerous places.83 “‘He emptied himself ’: 
he made himself small not by putting off greatness, but by taking on small-
ness.”84 In the same vein, Aquinas interprets Philippians 2:6–7 by means 
of the theme of the Verbum abbreviatum:
The Lord, i.e., God the Father, “will execute his brief word” [Rom 
9:28: verbum breviatum faciet Dominus], i.e., [his] incarnate [Word], 
because the Son of God emptied himself (exinanivit semetipsum), 
taking the form of a slave. He is called “emptied” (exinanitum) or 
“brief ” (breviatum), not because anything was subtracted from the 
fullness or greatness of his divinity, but because he assumed our 
thinness and smallness [nostram exilitatem et parvitatem suscepit].85
An illuminating exegesis of Philippians 2:6–7 is found in Aquinas’s expla-
nation of Jesus’s washing of the disciples’ feet in John 13:4. The biblical text 
reads: “He [ Jesus] rose from supper, laid aside his garments, and girded 
himself with a towel.” St. Thomas offers two “mystical” (mystice) interpre-
tations of this action, that is, interpretations that refer to the disclosure of 
Christ’s own mystery. The first interpretation refers to the Incarnation (the 
second one deals with Christ’s Passion):
This action tells us three things about Christ. First, he was willing to 
help the human race, indicated by the fact that he rose from supper. 
For God seems to be sitting down as long as he allows us to be trou-
bled; but when he rescues us from it, he seems to rise, as the Psalm 
(43:26) says: “Rise up, come to our help.” Secondly, it indicates that 
he emptied himself [exinanitio eius]: not that he abandoned his 
great dignity, but he hid it by taking on our smallness [non quidem 
82  ST III, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2.
83  See also the quote from the Sermon Puer Iesus above (at note 47).
84  Super Gal 4, lec. 2 (no. 203): “Parvum se fecit non dimittendo magnitudinem, sed 
assumendo parvitatem.”
85  Super Rom 9, lec. 5 (no. 805). For more on this topic (with special attention to 
Aquinas’s sources), see Agnès Bastit, “Sermo compendiatus. La parole raccourcie 
(Is. 10, 23 LXX / Rom. 9, 28) dans la tradition chrétienne latine,” in Nihil veri-
tas erubescit: Mélanges offerts à Paul Mattei par ses élèves, collègues et amis, ed. 
Camille Gerzaguet, Jérémy Delmulle, and Clémentine Bernard-Valette (Turn-
hout: Brepols, 2017), 389–407.
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quod suae dignitatis maiestatem deponeret, sed eam occultaret, parvi-
tatem assumendo]: “Truly, thou art a God who hidest thyself ” (Isa 
45:15). This is shown by the fact that he laid aside his garments: “he 
emptied himself, taking the form of a servant” (Phil 2:7). Thirdly, 
the fact that he girded himself with a towel indicates that he took on 
our mortality [assumptio nostrae mortalitatis]: “Taking the form of a 
servant, being born in the likeness of men” (Phil 2:7).86
This exegesis understands the action of the washing of the feet as an 
explication of the kenosis. It underlines, first, the voluntary nature of the 
kenosis of Christ: it is by will, freely, that the Son of God emptied himself. 
Second, the kenosis does not involve any diminution of the divine majesty 
of Christ, but it signifies the assumption of our human nature. On the one 
hand, Thomas’s exegesis contrasts the “majesty” of the divinity and the 
“smallness” of our humanity. On the other hand, Aquinas adds here an 
important element of exegesis: the divinity of Christ is not lost but it is 
“veiled” or “hidden” in the Incarnation. In this connection, we note that 
in his Catena on Matthew, Aquinas records Origen’s exegesis explaining 
that, in his exinanitio, Christ exercises a limited power (virtus . . . modica) 
in comparison with the great power (virtus multa) that he will exercise 
at his glorious return at the end of time.87 Third, the Son of God has 
assumed not only a humanity, but also the weaknesses of our condition: 
Thomas mentions here “mortality” (which one can extend to the defectus 
that the Son has assumed, with the exception of sin). According to this 
exegesis, Philippians 2 and John 13 reveal the whole mystery of Christ as 
the incarnate Son of God. The mystery is disclosed and really given within 
the dispensatio.
Trinitarian Processions, Missions, and Creation
We have already observed that, on many occasions (in an anti-adoptionist 
context and above all in the anti-Nestorian context), Aquinas excludes an 
86  Super Ioan 13, lec. 2 (no. 1746). This exegesis comes from Origen and St. Augus-
tine. See Catena in Ioan 13, lec. 1 (Marietti ed., 2:504): Augustine, Tractatus 
in Iohannis Evangelium  LV, 7 (CCSL,  36, 466); Origen, Commentary on John 
32.4.42–53 (SCh, 385:204–9). In Origen, the episode of the washing of the feet 
in John 13 is the “principal image” of the kenosis of the Son; see Vito Limone, “La 
kénosi del Figlio: L’incarnazione di Cristo nel Commento a Giovanni di Origene,” 
Annales Theologici 29 (2015): 77–96, at 73–76.
87  Catena in Matt 24, lec. 8 (Marietti ed., 1:355; for Origen’s text, see PG, 13:1677–
78).
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economic kenosis of the person of the Father and the person of the Holy 
Spirit. He therefore expressly rejects any economic kenosis of the Trin-
ity. More profoundly still, the Trinitarian doctrine of Aquinas excludes 
an immanent kenosis (a kenosis of the Trinity in its inner life). Indeed, 
Thomas apprehends the Trinitarian processions as the eternal communica-
tion of the plenitude of the divine nature in the perfect simplicity of God 
which excludes all mutability, because God is pure Act.
The intra-Trinitarian processions amount to a pure order (ordo) of 
origin that excludes any confusion of divine persons. The “order” signifies 
that one person is distinguished from another according to origin: the Son 
is engendered by the Father, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and 
the Son.88 More precisely, the divine persons are distinguished and consti-
tuted by their personal relations, in which the Trinitarian order precisely 
consists. First, with respect to their being (esse), these relations do not 
modify the divine essence, but they include the divine essence: personal 
relations are really identical with the divine essence, which is numerically 
one in the three persons. Second, with respect to their formality (ratio), the 
relations do not posit “something” (aliquid) but “a reference to someone 
else” (ad aliquid, ad aliud).89 Thus, the origins (generation and procession) 
bring about neither a change nor a diminution of the persons who are 
the subject of the act of generation and of spiration, and they imply no 
“distance” or “separation” between the divine persons.90
Further, for Aquinas, the divine processions do not imply any “passiv-
ity” in the Son who is begotten or in the Holy Spirit who is spirated. To 
proceed is an act. It is by one and the same operation that the Father begets 
and that the Son is born from all eternity, but this one operation is in the 
Father and in the Son under distinct relations: paternity and filiation.91 The 
same teaching applies to the procession of the Holy Spirit: it is by one and 
88  De potentia, q. 10, a. 2, resp.: “It is only the order of the processions, which arises 
from their origin, that multiplies [processions] in God” (“Et sic solus ordo proces-
sionum qui attenditur secundum originem processionis, multiplicat in divinis”).
89  ST I, qq. 28–30 and q. 40.
90  ST I, q. 31, a. 2 (no diversity, no separation, no division, no disparity, no 
discrepancy); q. 33, a. 1, ad 1 (no diversity, no distance); q. 42, a. 5, ad 2 (no 
distance).
91  In I sent., d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1: “Generation signifies relation by way of an opera-
tion. . . . And although ‘to beget’ does not belong to the Son, this does not mean 
that there would be some operation belonging to the Father and not to the Son. 
Rather, it is by one and the same operation that the Father begets and the Son is 
born, but this operation is in the Father and in the Son according to two distinct 
relations.”
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the same operation that the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit, 
and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son: however, 
in the Father and the Son this one operation possesses the relative mode 
of “spiration,” while in the Holy Spirit it possesses the relative mode of 
“procession.” Aquinas strictly maintains, as a fundamental rule, that “the 
only ‘passive’ that we posit among the divine persons is grammatical, 
according to our mode of signifying; i.e., we speak of the Father begetting 
and of the Son being begotten.”92
With regard to the sending (“mission”) of the Son and the Holy Spirit, 
it involves no distance or separation of the persons who are sent in rela-
tion to the persons who send,93 and it excludes all change in the persons 
sent.94 For Aquinas (and this matters for the understanding of Philippians 
2:6–7), the mission of the divine person “is not essentially different from 
the eternal procession, but only adds a reference to a temporal effect.”95 
All the change implied in the mission is found in the creature and not in 
the divinity of the person sent. The “newness” (novitas) that is found in 
God’s effects implies no newness in God himself.96 This applies not only 
to creation but also to the Incarnation, and therefore to the kenosis of the 
Son as understood by St. Thomas: the hypostatic union “is a relation [rela-
tio] which is found between the divine and the human nature, inasmuch 
as they come together in the one person of the Son of God.”97 To be more 
precise: the relation is real in the creature, but it is “of reason” in God “since 
92  ST I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3: “Non ponuntur ibi passiones [in divinis personis], nisi solum 
grammatice loquendo, quantum ad modum significandi; sicut Patri attribuimus 
generare, et Filio generari.”
93  ST I, q. 43, a. 1, ad 2.
94   ST I, q. 43, a. 2, ad 2: the only change is found in the creature to which the 
divine person is sent.
95  In I Sent. d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, resp.: “Processio temporalis non est alia quam processio 
aeterna essentialiter, sed addit aliquem respectum ad effectum temporalem.” The 
phrase “temporal procession” (processio temporalis) refers to the same reality as the 
mission (missio), with a nuance: in the concept of “mission,” the relationship to the 
created effect is put in the foreground, whereas the phrase “temporal procession” 
first stresses the relationship to the sender, that is, the coming forth of the person 
sent (In I sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, resp.). See also ST I, q. 43, a. 2, ad 3: “A mission 
includes the eternal procession, and adds something, namely, a temporal effect” 
(“missio includit processionem aeternam, et aliquid addit, scilicet temporalem 
effectum”).
96  SCG II, ch. 35 (no. 1112).
97  ST III, q. 2, a. 7, resp. As a conclusion, and quite significantly, Aquinas maintains 
that the hypostatic union is “something created” (aliquid creatum).
 Gilles Emery, O.P.860
it does not arise from any change in God.”98
Lastly, a final clarification is required with regard to the action of God 
the Trinity in the world. In creating, God does not withdraw from the 
world, but rather he is present in the world. Creatures exist in the measure 
to which God is present in them, an intimate presence.99 When God acts in 
the world, (1) he does not withdraw in any way from creatures, but instead 
communicates to them a participation in his goodness, and (2) he does not 
lose anything of himself. “God communicates his goodness to creatures so 
that nothing is subtracted from him” (“Deus sic suam bonitatem creaturis 
communicat quod nihil ei subtrahitur”).100 This theological principle is 
explicitly applied to Christ’s exinanitio: nothing was subtracted from the 
fullness or greatness of his divinity.101 
Trinitarian Foundations of the Son’s Exinanitio
In the context of the exegesis of Philippians 2:6–7 (we limit ourselves to 
this context), Aquinas presents two Trinitarian foundations of the kenosis 
of the Son. The first foundation consists in the notion of “divine person” 
in relation to the notion of “nature.” The second foundation resides in the 
relation between the “form of God” (Phil 2:6) and the personal properties 
of the Son.
Divine Personality, Nature, and Subsistence
We recall first that, for Aquinas, the assumption of a human nature belongs 
supremely to the divine person (propriissime competit personae assumere 
naturam), since the act pertains properly to the person (personae proprie 
competit agere) and since it also pertains to the person to be the term 
98  ST III, q. 2, a. 7, resp. Aquinas considers the relations of God and the creature as 
a pair of relations wherein one is “real” (in the creature) and the other “of reason” 
(in God); cf. ST I, q. 13, a. 7. On this, see Gilles Emery, “Ad aliquid. Relation in 
the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,” in Theology Needs Philosophy: Acting Against 
Reason is Contrary to the Nature of God, ed. Matthew L. Lamb (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 175–201.
99  See Emery, Présence de Dieu, 62–65 and 94–95.
100  SCG IV, ch. 34 (no. 3715). I have dealt at greater length with this issue in my essay 
“The Immutability of the God of Love and the Problem of Language Concerning 
the ‘Suffering of God,’” in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, 
ed. James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2009), 27–76.
101  Super Rom 9, lec. 5 (no. 805): “Filius Dei exinanivit semetispum . . . non quia 
aliquid subtractum sit plenitudini vel magnitudini divinitatis ipsius (The Son of 
God emptied himself . . . , not because anything was subtracted from the fullness 
or greatness of his divinity).”
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(terminus) of the assumption.102 Admittedly, to be the principle of the 
assumption can also belong to the divine nature in itself (natura divina 
secundum seipsam), since the action is brought about by the power (virtus) 
pertaining to the nature, “but to be the term of the assumption [esse termi-
num assumptionis] does not belong to the divine nature in itself, since [it 
belongs to the divine nature] by reason of the person [ratione personae] 
in whom [this nature] is considered.”103 This is why “in the primary and 
most proper sense, it is the person who is said to assume [primo quidem et 
propriissime persona dicitur assumere],” although “in a secondary sense, it 
can also be said that the nature assumes a nature to its person [secundario 
autem potest dici quod etiam natura assumit naturam ad sui personam].”104
Now, in his disputed question De unione Verbi incarnati, Aquinas 
formulates the following objection against the doctrine of “the union in 
the person”: “Nothing that is included in another stretches out to some-
thing outside. . . . But the suppositum of any nature is found in that nature, 
hence it is called a thing of nature. . . . So, since the Word is a suppositum 
of the divine nature, it is not able to stretch out to another nature so as to 
be its suppositum, unless one nature is brought about.”105 This objection 
is quite clear: the hypostatic union takes place in one nature, and not in a 
person that would have two natures, because the person does not extend 
itself beyond its nature. The core of the objection lies in the fact that a 
person is a person of this nature, in a manner similar to the way according 
to which an individual is included under a species, so that this individual 
cannot extend beyond this species. Here is Aquinas’s response:
The person of the Word is included under the nature of the Word, 
nor can it extend itself to something beyond. But the nature of the 
Word, by reason of its own infinity, includes every finite nature. 
Thus, when the person of the Word assumes a human nature, it 
does not extend itself beyond the divine nature, but the greater 
receives what is beneath it. Hence, it is said in Philippians II [:6–7] 
that “while” the Son of God “was in the form of God, he emptied 
102  ST III, q. 3, a. 1, resp.
103  ST III, q. 3, a. 2, resp.
104  ST III, q. 3, a. 2, resp.
105  De unione Verbi incarnati, a. 1, obj. 14: “Nihil quod comprehenditur sub alio, 
extendit se ad aliquid extrinsecum. . . . Sed suppositum cuiuslibet naturae compre-
henditur sub natura illa, unde et dicitur res naturae. . . . Cum ergo Verbum sit 
suppositum divinae naturae, non potest se extendere ad aliam naturam ut sit eius 
suppositum, nisi efficiatur natura una.”
 Gilles Emery, O.P.862
himself.” Not laying aside the greatness of the form of God, but 
assuming the smallness of human nature.106
In this answer, Aquinas maintains that the person of the Word cannot 
“extend itself ” beyond the divine nature. But this does not imply that the 
person of the Word cannot assume a created nature. The reason for this 
statement lies in the infinity of the divine nature of the Word. The created 
nature assumed by the Word does not add anything to the divine nature, 
since the divine nature cannot receive any addition. The divine nature and 
the human nature cannot be connumerated, because they are not of the 
same order. Since God is absolutely simple, he is beyond every genus. God 
is not part of any genus; rather, he is the principle of all genera, “outside 
the order of all creatures” of which he is the transcendent cause.107 And 
not only is the divine nature outside the order of creatures, but the divine 
nature or essence also contains in itself, in a supereminent mode, all the 
perfections that are found in creatures: “The divine essence is . . . above 
every genus, embracing in itself [comprehendens in se] the perfections of 
all genera.”108 The reference to the Son’s exinanitio in Philippians 2 makes 
it quite clear: because of the infinity of his divine nature, which “includes 
every finite nature [comprehendit omnem naturam finitam],” the person of 
the Son can assume a “smaller” nature in the unity of his own person. This 
is not far from Aquinas’s statement that “it is a greater dignity to exist in 
something nobler than oneself, than to exist by oneself. Hence the human 
nature of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in 
106  De unione Verbi incarnati, a. 1, ad. 14: “Persona Verbi comprehenditur sub natura 
Verbi, nec potest se ad aliquid ultra extendere. Sed natura Verbi, ratione suae 
infinitatis, comprehendit omnem naturam finitam. Et ideo, cum persona Verbi 
assumit naturam humanam, non se extendit ultra naturam divinam, sed magis 
accipit quod est infra. Unde dicitur Ad Philipp. II, quod cum in forma Dei esset 
Dei Filius, semetipsum exinanivit; non quidem deponens magnitudinem formae 
Dei, sed assumens parvitatem humanae naturae.”
107  ST I, q. 3, a. 6, ad 2: “Quamvis Deus non sit primum contentum in genere 
substantiae, sed primum extra omne genus, respectu totius esse (Although God 
is not the first [thing] contained in the genus of substance, he is first—outside of 
every genus—in respect to all being).” ST I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 2: “Deus non se habet 
ad creaturas sicut res diversorum generum, sed sicut id quod est extra omne genus, 
et principium omnium generum (God is not related to creatures as belonging to 
a different genus, but as being outside of every genus and as being the principle of 
all genera).” ST I, q. 28, a. 1, ad 3: “Deus est extra ordinem totius creaturae (God 
is outside the order of all creatures).”
108  De potentia, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1: “Sed essentia divina non est in genere substantiae, sed 
est supra omne genus, comprehendens in se omnium generum perfectiones.”
Kenosis, Christ, and the Trinity in Thomas Aquinas 863
us, being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it exists 
in the person of the Word.”109
The Summa theologiae offers a similar teaching. In the question asking 
“whether it is fitting for a divine person to assume a created nature,” an 
objection states that “to be incommunicable” belongs to the very notion 
of “person” (de ratione personae est quod sit incommunicabilis),110 so that a 
divine person cannot assume a created nature, since the person in which a 
created nature is assumed somehow “communicates” itself to the created 
nature that is assumed into this person, “just as dignity is communicated 
to the one that is assumed to a dignity.”111 Aquinas’s reply reads as follows:
A divine person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch as it cannot 
be predicated of several supposita; but nothing prevents several 
things being predicated of the person. Hence it is not contrary to 
the notion of “person” to be communicated so as to subsist in several 
natures. For even in a created person several natures may come 
together accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quantity 
and quality. But the characteristic proper to a divine person is that, 
on account of its infinity, the coming together of natures in it [the 
person] is wrought not accidentally, but in subsistence.112
We find here (though without mention of Phil 2:7) the same reference 
to the divine infinity already seen in the disputed question De unione 
Verbi incarnati. In the Summa theologiae, however, infinity is attributed 
directly to the person. The context (the incommunicability of the person) 
leads Aquinas to formulate this clarification: the person is communicated 
to the human nature that subsists in this person, in such a way that the 
person conserves his incommunicability as person, since his subsistence 
109  ST III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.
110  See ST I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 4. In Aquinas’s understanding of the definition of persona 
given by Boethius, the person’s incommunicability is signified by the “individual 
substance.” See also ST I, q. 29, a. 4, ad 3.
111  ST III, q. 3, a. 1, obj. 2.
112  ST III, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2: “Persona dicitur incommunicabilis inquantum non potest de 
pluribus suppositis praedicari. Nihil tamen prohibet plura de persona praedicari. 
Unde non est contra rationem personae sic communicari ut subsistat in pluribus 
naturis. Quia etiam in personam creatam possunt plures naturae concurrere acci-
dentaliter, sicut in persona unius hominis invenitur quantitas et qualitas. Hoc 
autem est proprium divinae personae, propter eius infinitatem, ut fiat in ea concur-
sus naturarum, non quidem accidentaliter, sed secundum subsistentiam.”
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is not communicated to another person. In addition to the theme of the 
“personalization” of the human nature by and in the person of the Word, 
and in addition to the exclusion of Nestorianism (an omnipresent prob-
lematic), one also finds here what Aquinas explains when he defines the 
“grace of union,” that is to say, the hypostatic union itself: “The ‘grace of 
union’ [gratia unionis] is the personal being itself [ipsum esse personale] that 
is given gratis from above to the human nature in the person of the Word, 
and that is the term of the assumption (terminus assumptionis).”113 In this 
way, “the eternal being of the Son of God, which is the divine nature, 
becomes the being of man, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by 
the Son of God to unity of person.”114
Here I suggest that we should consider Cajetan’s interpretation. In his 
commentary on ST III, q. 2, a. 2, Cajetan recalls several times the follow-
ing principle as a key to understanding the relation between nature and 
person in the Incarnation: “Everything that is found in a person, whether 
it belongs to its nature or not, is united to it in the person.”115 Then, in his 
commentary on q. 3, a. 1, Cajetan recalls that, in the hypostatic union, 
nothing is added to God, but God is united to a man so that this man is 
God: an infinite perfection is added, not to God who is immutable, but to 
the human nature.116 On this basis, Cajetan focuses on the self-commu-
nication of the divine person that takes place by virtue of its infinity, and 
113  ST III, q. 6, a. 6, resp. Cf. Super Rom 1, lec. 3 (no. 46): Christ’s humanity is united 
to his divinity “through a union in personal being [per unionem in esse personali]: 
and this is called the grace of union [gratia unionis].” See also Super Ioan 3, lec. 6 
(no. 544): “The grace of union . . . is a certain gratuitous gift that is given to Christ 
in order that in his human nature he be the true Son of God, not by participation, 
but by nature, insofar as the human nature of Christ is united to the Son of God 
in person.”
114  ST III, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2: “Illud esse aeternum Filii Dei quod est divina natura, fit esse 
hominis, inquantum humana natura assumitur a Filio Dei in unitate personae”; cf. 
ibid., resp.
115   Cajetan, In III ST, q. 2, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 11:25–29): “Omne quod inest alicui 
personae, sive pertineat ad naturam eius sive non, unitur ei in persona.” This prin-
ciple is formulated by Aquinas himself in ST III, q. 2, a. 2, resp.
116  Cajetan, In III ST, q. 3, a. 1, no. ii (Leonine ed., 11:54). In a sense, however, some-
thing is added to the notion of “person”: “Unio naturae humanae in mysterio incar-
nationis non addit aliquid rationi naturae, sed bene addit aliquid rationi personae, 
quia addit subsistere in natura humana: et ideo unio facta est, non in natura, sed 
in persona (The union of the human nature, in the mystery of the Incarnation, 
does not add anything to the ‘reason’ of nature, but it does add something to the 
‘reason’ of person, since it adds [that the person] subsists in the human nature; and 
therefore, the union did not take place in the nature, but in the person)” (Cajetan, 
In III ST, q. 2, a. 2, no. viii [Leonine ed., 11:27]).
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he makes this illuminating distinction: the Word is infinite radicaliter by 
reason of his deity, and he is infinite formaliter by reason of his personality 
(namely, his divine filiation), since divine subsistence (which is infinite) 
is formally included in the personality of the Word.117 This is perfectly 
consistent with Aquinas’s own teaching. On the one hand, Aquinas iden-
tifies the divine person of the Son with his relation (or personal property) 
of filiation;118 on the other hand, since the Son is a person who subsists by 
virtue of his relation of filiation, Aquinas also identifies the Son’s “person-
ality” with his relation of filiation.119 So, it is because of the infinity of the 
personality of the Word, which formally includes divine subsistence, that 
the person of the Word can subsist in two natures by “substantifying” the 
human nature in himself, so that the incarnate Word is a person of human 
nature.120
By his Incarnation, the Word, who is a person of divine nature, becomes 
117  Cajetan, In III ST, q. 3, a. 1, no. v (Leonine ed., 11:54): “Verbum est infinitum 
secundum rationem deitatis radicaliter, quia ex deitate quidquid est in Deo 
infinitatem habet: sed secundum suam personalitatem est formaliter infinitum, 
quoniam personalitas divina non est constitutiva personae nisi infinitae. Et 
quemadmodum personalitas Verbi, scilicet filiatio divina, est formaliter subsistens, 
alioquin non esset constitutiva personae, quae formaliter est subsistens, ita est 
formaliter infinita: quia subsistentia formaliter inclusa in personalitate Verbi nec 
est finita (The Word is radically infinite according to the ‘reason’ of deity because, 
by virtue of the deity, everything that is in God has infinity; but according to his 
personality, the Word is formally infinite, because divine personality constitutes an 
infinite person. And just as the personality of the Word, that is, divine sonship, is 
formally subsisting—otherwise it would not constitute a person who is formally 
subsisting—so this personality is formally infinite: because the subsistence that is 
formally included in the personality of the Word, is not finite).”
118  ST I, q. 30, a. 2, ad 1: “Paternitas est persona Patris, filiatio persona Filii, processio 
persona Spiritus Sancti procedentis (Paternity is the person of the Father, filiation 
is the person of the Son, procession is the person of the Holy Spirit proceeding)” 
(cf. q. 32, a. 2, ad 2).
119  In I sent., d. 19, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1: “Filius ex ipsa relatione est persona subsistens; sua 
enim relatio est sua personalitas (The Son, by virtue of his relation [namely, filia-
tion], is a subsisting person: for his relation is his personality).”
120  Cajetan, In III ST, q. 3, a. 1, no. v (Leonine ed., 11:55): “Filius Dei, quatenus 
subsistens, naturam humanam substantificat. Unde patet quod Verbum, secundum 
illam suae personalitatis rationem qua est subsistens, ac per hoc infinitae subsis-
tentiae, vices humanae personae formaliter et eminenter in mysterio incarnationis 
supplet: est enim Verbum persona humanae naturae (The Son of God, insofar as 
he subsists, substantifies the human nature. Therefore, it is clear that the Word, 
according to the very ‘reason’ of his personality by virtue of which he is subsisting 
and is of an infinite subsistence, formally and eminently fills in for a human person 
in the mystery of the Incarnation: indeed, the Word is a person of human nature).”
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a “person of human nature” (persona humanae naturae),121 without ceasing 
to be a person of divine nature: this is precisely the center of Aquinas’s 
understanding of Christ’s exinanitio. As a result, the first Trinitarian foun-
dation of Christ’s kenosis lies in the infinity of the person of the Word, that 
is to say, in the infinity of his divine subsistence and personality, by virtue 
of his personal relation of filiation.
The “Form of God” and the Personal Property of the Son
The second Trinitarian foundation of the exinanitio of the Son is found in 
the theological explanation of the forma Dei (Phil 2:6). Most of the Latin 
Fathers by whom Aquinas is inspired (such as Ambrose, Augustine, and 
Leo) identify forma with natura: the “form of God” is the “divine nature.”122 
This identification (forma = natura or essentia) appears massively in the 
medieval theologians (the Glossa interlinearis, Peter Lombard, Gilbert of 
Poitiers, etc.) and in the contemporaries of Aquinas.123 St. Thomas repeats 
it in many places,124 but this is not his only interpretation. In his commen-
tary on the Letter to the Philippians, Aquinas begins by explaining the 
Latin word forma in the sense of natura rei. Then he brings forward a first 
nuance by explaining that, due to the perfect simplicity of God, “the form 
121  Aquinas, De rationibus fidei, ch. 6: “Cum igitur Filius Dei, unigenitum scilicet 
Dei Verbum, per assumptionem habeat humanam naturam, . . . sequitur quod 
sit suppositum, hypostasis vel persona humanae naturae; et cum habeat ab 
aeterno divinam naturam, . . . dicitur etiam hypostasis vel persona divinae natu-
rae, secundum tamen quod divina humanis verbis exprimi possunt. Ipsum igitur 
unigenitum Dei Verbum est hypostasis vel persona duarum naturarum, divinae 
scilicet et humanae, in duabus naturis subsistens (Since the Son of God, that is, the 
only-begotten Word of God, has assumed a human nature, . . . it follows that he 
is a supposit, a hypostasis or person of human nature; and since he has the divine 
nature from eternity, . . . he is also called a hypostasis or a person of divine nature, 
insofar, however, as divine things can be expressed by human words. Therefore 
the only-begotten Word of God is a hypostasis or person of two natures, namely, 
divine and human, and he subsists in these two natures)” (Leonine ed., 40B:64).
122  Pidolle, La christologie historique, 91–92.
123  Dahan, “L’exégèse médiévale,” 85–86.
124  See, for instance, SCG IV, ch. 7 (no. 3413): “Per formam autem Dei non aliud 
intelligitur quam natura divina (By the ‘form of God,’ nothing else is understood 
than the divine nature).” See also ST III, q. 19, a. 1, resp.: “Dicit Leo Papa, in Epis-
tola ad Flavianum: agit utraque forma, scilicet tam natura divina quam humana in 
Christo, cum alterius communione, quod proprium est, Verbo scilicet operante quod 
Verbi est, et carne exequente quod carnis est (In his Letter to Flavian, Pope Leo 
says: Both forms, namely, both the divine nature and the human nature in Christ, 
do what is proper to each in communion with the other, that is, the Word performs 
what belongs to the Word, and the flesh carries out what belongs to flesh).”
Kenosis, Christ, and the Trinity in Thomas Aquinas 867
of God” (forma Dei) is nothing else than “God himself ” (ipse Deus).125 On 
this basis, Aquinas introduces a second nuance by asking: “Why does St. 
Paul say ‘in the form’ [in forma] rather than ‘in the nature’ [in natura]?” 
Here is his answer to this question:
Because this belongs to the proper names of the Son [competit 
nominibus propriis Filii] in three ways. For he is called the Son, the 
Word, and the Image. [1] The Son is the one who is begotten, and the 
end of begetting is the form. Therefore, to show the perfect Son of 
God [perfectus Dei Filius] he says “in the form,” as having the form 
of the Father perfectly. [2] Similarly, a word is not perfect unless it 
leads to the knowledge of a thing’s nature; and so the Word of God 
is said to be “in the form of God,” because he has the entire nature 
of the Father [totam naturam Patris]. [3] Similarly again, an image is 
not perfect unless it has the “form” of that of which it is the image: 
“He reflects the glory of God [splendor gloriae] and bears the very 
stamp of his nature [ figura substantiae eius; Heb 1:3].”126
This Trinitarian interpretation is extremely interesting. Aquinas affirms 
clearly the perfect consubstantiality of the Son with the Father (their 
perfect unity of nature), but he is not satisfied with a pure and simple iden-
tification or equivalence between “form” and “nature.” Rather, in Philippi-
ans 2:6, forma refers to the divine nature inasmuch as it is possessed by the 
Son, that is to say, the divine nature according to the proper mode that it has 
in the person of the Son. “Forma” here refers to the divine nature (1) insofar 
as the Son receives this nature through his generation from the Father, (2) 
insofar as the Father’s nature is perfectly expressed in the Word of the Father, 
and (3) insofar as the Son, being the perfect Image of the Father, reflects the 
Father’s glory. Put otherwise, by associating forma Dei with names proper 
to the Son, Thomas interprets this forma Dei in the light of the personal 
property of the Son signified by his three proper names.127 Thus, the point 
of departure of the exinanitio is found in the person of the Son inasmuch 
as he possesses the very nature of the Father in his proper mode, which is 
being the Son, Word, and Image of the Father.128 We are here very near to 
125  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 54).
126  Super Phil 2, lec. 2 (no. 54).
127  “Son,” “Word,” and “Image” are the three proper names that Thomas sets forth in 
his study of the Son in ST I, qq. 34–35.
128  On the mode of existence (modus existendi) proper to each divine person, see: De 
potentia, q. 2, a. 1, ad 13; q. 2, a. 5, ad 5; q. 3, a. 15, ad 17; q. 9, a. 5, ad 23.
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explanations that, in his synthetic works, Thomas puts forward to show the 
fittingness of the Incarnation of the Son.129
Thus, the Trinitarian foundations of the exinanitio of the Son bring 
us back to the teaching of Aquinas on the assumption of a human nature 
by the divine person and on the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Son, 
that is to say, to the teaching of the first questions of the tertia pars of the 
Summa theologiae.
Conclusion
For Aquinas, the exinanitio of Christ means that the Son of God assumes, 
in the unity of his divine person, the “smallness” or “emptiness” of a human 
nature with all the “defects” (body and soul) that befit his mission of salva-
tion (and therefore that are compatible with his sinlessness). The exinanitio 
applies only to the Son (and not to the Father, nor to the Holy Spirit, nor to 
the Trinity as such), and to the Son in his Incarnation. This exinanitio does 
not imply any intra-Trinitarian distance, nor any change of the divine nature 
of the Son. It corresponds to the manner in which Thomas understands the 
relationships between the theologia and the economy (dispensatio).130
Aquinas offers an intertextual exegesis of Philippians 2:6–8 that he 
connects with other biblical texts, in particular John 1:14 and Colossians 
2:9. This exegesis pays great attention to the errors that can arise, especially 
to Monophysitism but also, in a striking manner, to Nestorianism. The 
Trinitarian dimension is not absent from the theology of Aquinas on the 
exinanitio of the Son. This Trinitarian dimension does not imply change 
in God the Trinity, or distance between the persons, or modification of 
the Trinitarian order. Rather, Aquinas renders account of the kenosis of 
the Son by invoking the infinity that the person of the Son possesses in 
virtue of his divine nature, because this infinity allows one to understand 
129  See In III sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, resp., where the fittingness (decentia) of the Incar-
nation of the Son (rather than of the Father or of the Holy Spirit) is explained 
by means of what is proper to the Son (ex propriis ejus, in propriis ipsius: “He is the 
Son, the Word, and the Image”) and by means of the essential attributes that are 
appropriated to him (wisdom, virtus, equality, and beauty). See also SCG IV, ch. 42 
(nos. 3801–803), where the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Son is explained 
by means of his personal property as Word and Image, and ST III, q. 3, a. 8, resp.: 
“It was most fitting that the person of the Son should become incarnate,” since the 
person of the Son (persona Filii) “is the Word of God.”
130  ST III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1: “in theologia, idest in deitate personarum, et in dispensatione, 
idest in mysterio incarnationis (in the theology, i.e. in the deity of the persons, 
and in the dispensation, i.e. in the mystery of the Incarnation).” See Gilles Emery, 
“Theologia and Dispensatio: The Centrality of the Divine Missions in St. Thomas’s 
Trinitarian Theology,” The Thomist 74 (2010): 515–61.
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that the Son “has become what he was not, without ceasing to be what 
he was.”131 Aquinas also renders account of the kenosis by means of the 
personal property of the Son, in a manner very close to his arguments of 
fittingness in favor of the Incarnation of the Son. Thus, for Aquinas, the 
kenosis of Philippians 2:6–8 offers a complete summation of the doctrine 
of the Incarnation, a teaching that stands in perfect consonance with the 
Christology of his synthetic works.
131  See notes 17 and 18 above.
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